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Abstract
This paper analysis whether the adoption of in￿ ation targeting a⁄ects ex-
cessive exchange rate volatility, i.e. the share of exchange rate ￿ uctuations
not related to economic fundamentals. Using a signal-extraction approach to
estimate this excessive volatility in multivariate exchange rates in a sample
of forty-four countries, the empirical results show no systematic relationship
between in￿ ation targeting and excessive exchange rate volatility. Joint analy-
sis of the e⁄ects of in￿ ation targeting and EMU membership shows, however,
that a membership in the monetary union signi￿cantly reduces this excessive
volatility. Together, the results suggest that ￿ oating exchange rates not only
serve as a shock absorber but are also an independent source of shocks, and
that these excessive ￿ uctuations in exchange rates can be reduced by joining a
monetary union. At the same time the results suggest that adopting in￿ ation
targeting does not by itself contribute to excessive exchange rate volatility.
JEL classi￿cation: F31; E31; E42; E52; E58.
Keywords: Exchange rate volatility; Exchange rate misalignements; In-
￿ ation targeting; Monetary policy regimes.
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Bank of Iceland.1. Introduction
It is sometimes argued that the adoption of in￿ ation targeting (IT) leads to increased
volatility of other economic variables, such as output, employment and the exchange
rate. In the case of the exchange rate, the argument goes that IT puts too much
emphasis on stabilising the domestic value of the currency thus leading to benign
neglect of stabilising its external value, ultimately resulting in increased exchange
rate volatility.
This observation is true to the extent that most countries that have adopted IT
did so after exiting an exchange rate peg or an exchange rate regime that focused
on exchange rate stability and thus experienced some increase in exchange rate vari-
ability. However, the fact that IT usually requires some exchange rate ￿ exibility
which necessarily leads to greater exchange rate variability is not a very interesting
or insightful observation. It is obvious that ￿ oating exchange rates move more than
￿xed ones. But at the same time it is also obvious that not all exchange rate move-
ments are economically costly. As exchange rates are relative prices, some exchange
rate movement is both necessary and helpful for economic adjustment to shocks.
The problem is, however, that a growing number of empirical studies suggests that
exchange rates move ￿ too much￿ , i.e. that exchange rate volatility is greater than
is warranted by movements in economic fundamentals. Exchange rates therefore
become a source of shocks rather than merely serving as a shock absorber. In the
context of the relationship between IT and exchange rate volatility, the real issue is
therefore whether IT a⁄ects this ￿ excessive￿component of exchange rate variability.
This paper attempts to address this issue.
For this, the paper uses a signal-extraction approach designed to extract model
noise from rational expectations present-value models to estimate excessive exchange
rate volatility from multilateral exchange rates of forty-four countries, ranging from
lower-medium income countries to highly developed countries. First, two di⁄erent
generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) speci￿cations are
estimated for each country and then a panel setup is applied where the IT countries
serve as a treatment group and the remaining non-targeting countries as a control
group. Overall, the results suggest no apparent relationship between IT and exces-
sive exchange rate volatility. The claim that IT leads to detrimental exchange rate
volatility is therefore refuted in this country sample.
The country sample used in this study also includes another important monetary
policy regime switch, i.e. the establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU)
in 1999. If exchange rates move too much, an entry into a monetary union should see
a clear decline in excessive exchange rate volatility. EMU membership can therefore
serve as a check on the ability of the framework proposed to detect the relation
between monetary policy regimes and excessive exchange rate volatility. The e⁄ects
of EMU membership are also of interest in itself as the existence of a signi￿cant
EMU e⁄ect on excessive exchange rate volatility lends support to the argument
that ￿ oating exchange rates are too volatile. Repeating the analysis using the same
GARCH speci￿cations as before and the panel speci￿cation for testing the EMU e⁄ect
separately and jointly with the IT e⁄ect gives a signi￿cant negative relation between
2EMU membership and excessive exchange rate volatility. Thus, EMU membership
leads to a signi￿cant reduction in excessive exchange rate volatility, while the IT
e⁄ect continues to be insigni￿cant.
The results are found robust to a battery of alterations of the empirical setup:
using di⁄erent IT adoption dates, changing the control group, using cross-sectional
di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimation, adding periodic ￿xed e⁄ects, using di⁄erent spec-
i￿cation of the exchange rate volatility measure, changing the timing structure of
the monetary policy regime dummies, or using instrumental variables to capture the
possibility that the regime changes are endogenous.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the IT
framework and the empirical literature on the macroeconomic e⁄ects of IT, including
its possible e⁄ects on exchange rates. Section 3 discusses the concept of excessive
exchange rate volatility and how to extract it from the data. Section 4 discusses the
country sample, while Section 5 presents the empirical analysis on the relationship
between IT and excessive exchange rate volatility using both GARCH estimates for
individual countries and panel estimates for the country sample as a whole. This
section also presents a similar analysis of the e⁄ects of EMU membership on excessive
exchange rate volatility, both individually and jointly with the IT e⁄ect. The section
is completed with a wide array of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2. The in￿ ation-targeting framework
2.1. Characteristics of in￿ ation-targeting regimes
The chief characteristic of IT can be said to involve a public announcement of a nu-
merical target to which the central bank commits itself to keep in￿ ation as close as
possible through implementation of a forward-looking monetary policy. The bank￿ s
in￿ ation forecast several years ahead plays a key role in communicating informa-
tion about monetary policy and its likely next steps. This commitment to publish
regular in￿ ation forecasts based on a credible economic analysis also imposes an im-
portant constraint on central bank behaviour. Other important features of the IT
framework include a ￿rm emphasis on a broad-based institutional support for the
target and transparent decisions and accountability on the part of the central bank,
to signal its commitment to the in￿ ation target. The framework is, however, suf-
￿ciently ￿ exible to take into account short-term developments in the real economy.
IT therefore combines the advantages of a strict monetary policy rule and a pure
discretionary monetary policy. Indeed, Bernanke et al. (1999) describe IT as ￿ con-
strained discretion￿ , where the target imposes the constraint while the interpretation
and implementation provide the ￿ exibility.
2.2. A selective review of the empirical in￿ ation-targeting literature
The literature on the economic e⁄ects of IT is ever growing. This section will there-
fore only touch upon some of the main results. For a recent and more extensive
review of key results see, for example, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007).
3Among the key ￿ndings in this literature are that in￿ ation levels, volatility and
persistence have declined after IT adoption (e.g. Bernanke et al., 1999, Corbo et al.,
2001, Levin et al. 2004, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007, and PØtursson, 2005,
2009). Furthermore, some studies suggest that IT adoption has reduced the e⁄ects of
supply shocks on in￿ ation (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007) and made in￿ ation
more predictable (Corbo et al., 2001). Some studies also ￿nd that IT adoption
gradually reduces in￿ ation expectations (Johnson, 2002) and provides a ￿rmer long-
term anchor for in￿ ation expectations (Levin et al., 2004).
The literature also suggests that these nominal bene￿ts have not been obtained
at the cost of lower or more volatile output growth (e.g. Truman, 2003, PØtursson,
2005) and may even have reduced business cycles and the sacri￿ce ratio (Corbo et
al., 2001). Furthermore, Edwards (2007) and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007)
￿nd some evidence that IT adoption has reduced the pass-through of exchange rate
shocks to in￿ ation. Finally, some studies ￿nd that variouse aspects of monetary
policy conduct have improved after IT adoption (e.g. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel,
2007). Others, such as Ball and Sheridan (2005) are, however, more sceptical of the
bene￿ts of IT over other monetary policy frameworks.
2.3. In￿ ation targeting and exchange rate volatility
With most IT countries being small open economies, exchange rate developments
play a key role for the success of in￿ ation control and therefore for the success of the
IT regime. Exchange rate movements are an important channel in the transmission
of monetary policy and a⁄ect domestic prices directly, through prices of imported
goods and indirectly through the e⁄ects on domestic demand, net exports, and pri-
vate sector expectations. Exchange rate movements are also inherently hard to pre-
dict. Large exchange rate ￿ uctuations are therefore challenging for in￿ ation control,
especially in very small open economies and emerging market economies, where ex-
change rate pass-through is commonly found to be relatively high (e.g. PØtursson,
2009). Finally, exchange rate movements play an important role in transmitting
international shocks into the domestic economy.
Large exchange rate ￿ uctuations can also lead to real allocation problems and
to ￿nancial instability, all of which one would expect emerging market economies
to be particularly vulnerable to, as their ￿nancial system tend to be less developed
and their currencies less likely to be internationally traded, therefore reducing the
ability to hedge against this risk and share it across borders. This is likely to be
of special concern where large exchange rate misalignments emerge and the risks of
sudden reversals of capital ￿ ows rise. The same applies to foreign currency liabilities,
which tend to be much more common in emerging market countries compared to
their industrial counterparts. These balance-sheet currency mismatches make these
economies more vulnerable to a sharp exchange rate depreciation which could trigger
a full-blown ￿nancial crisis. Furthermore, the potential negative e⁄ects of exchange
rate volatility on competitiveness and trade volumes are probably of more concern for
emerging market countries as they are more trade-dependent and have a relatively
large tradable sector. Hedging against such exchange rate risk is also probably more
4expensive in these countries as their ￿nancial system is less developed, as previously
mentioned. The relatively less developed foreign exchange markets in emerging mar-
ket countries also make them more susceptible to a breakdown in the face of large
exchange rate ￿ uctuations as investors exit the market and assets denominated in
domestic currency suddenly become illiquid.1
How IT a⁄ects exchange rate volatility is therefore an important policy issue.
Yet, there is a surprising lack of studies on this issue compared to the vast literature
analysing other economic consequences of IT. This is all the more surprising given
the importance of exchange rate movements for economic developments and in￿ ation
performance, particularly for emerging market economies, which constitutes a large
share of the IT country group.
Furthermore, most of the analysis of the e⁄ects of IT on exchange rates focuses
on comparing unconditional exchange rate volatility before and after IT or between
IT and non-IT countries, leading some economic commentators to conclude that IT
leads to increased exchange rate volatility. Such an analysis is, however, of limited
interest. Most IT countries adopted IT after exiting a currency peg or some type of
managed ￿ oating system. As IT necessarily requires a more ￿ exible exchange rate
regime (cf. Mishkin and Savastano, 2001), it comes at no surprise that exchange rate
variability has increased after IT adoption, re￿ ecting the currency￿ s shock-absorber
role. It is not clear, however, how this by itself can be interpreted as a drawback to
the IT framework.
An important exception to this type of analysis is Edwards (2007). He esti-
mates GARCH models for seven IT countries and tests whether IT adoption has in-
creased multilateral exchange rate volatility, conditioning on the previous exchange
rate regime in each country. His results suggest that IT adoption has not increased
exchange rate volatility, once controlling for the previous exchange rate regime, and
has in fact tended to reduce volatility in some countries.
In another interesting paper, SabbÆn et al. (2004) use a structural VAR approach
to identify nominal and real exchange rate shocks. They build upon a growing
literature using structural VARs to analyse whether exchange rates play a role as
a shock absorber or are more an independent source of shocks (see below). They
￿nd that exchange rate movements become more responsive to real shocks after IT
adoption which might suggest that the ability of the exchange rate to act as a shock
absorber has improved under IT.
These two papers therefore suggest that IT does not lead to increased exchange
rate volatility and may even contribute to reducing it. This is consistent with Kut-
tner and Posen (2000), which show theoretically and empirically (using G3 bilateral
exchange rates) how increased transparency of monetary policy, which is generally
thought of as a centre piece of the IT framework, leads to increased exchange rate
stability.
This paper con￿rms the above results by looking at the relationship between IT
and ￿ excessive￿exchange rate volatility, i.e. the volatility in exchange rates that
1For a further discussion see, for example, Ho and McCauley (2003), Jonas and Mishkin (2005),
Mishkin and Savastano (2001), and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002).
5cannot be contributed to movements in economic fundamentals. This, in my view, is
the central issue in analysing the relationship between IT adoption and exchange rate
behaviour. If IT contributes to reducing excessive exchange rate volatility, another
important positive aspect of IT emerges. However, if IT contributes to increasing
excessive exchange rate volatility, the bene￿ts of other aspects of IT have to be
weighed against this drawback, which one might expect to signi￿cantly reduce the
net bene￿ts of IT adoption in emerging market economies and other small open
economies.
3. Excessive exchange rate volatility
3.1. Exchange rate disconnect
Since the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system in the early 1970s, increasing
evidence has emerged suggesting that ￿ oating exchange rates are much more volatile
than can reasonably be explained by economic fundamentals as derived from stan-
dard macroeconomic models. Furthermore, ￿ uctuations in exchange rates even seem
largely unrelated to variations in these fundamentals, cf. Meese and Rogo⁄ (1983)
who show how standard macroeconomic models fail miserably in predicting exchange
rate movements, even within sample. What is also intriguing is that these ￿ uctu-
ations, at least in large and developed countries, do not seem to matter much for
general macroeconomic performance, cf. Krugman (1989). Flood and Rose (1995)
reach a similar conclusion. They ￿nd that exchange rate volatility di⁄ers signif-
icantly between di⁄erent exchange rate regimes whereas the volatility of economic
fundamentals does not. This is the so-called ￿ exchange rate disconnect￿(e.g. Obstfeld
and Rogo⁄, 2000).
This apparent disconnect between exchange rates and economic fundamentals
puts serious question marks over the standard notion that a key role of exchange
rates is to act as a shock absorber. According to this standard view, an economic
shock (e.g. to technology, terms of trade, preferences, etc.) is partially absorbed
by the exchange rate, therefore mitigating the (presumably more costly) adjustment
in the real economy. If exchange rates ￿ uctuate beyond what is needed to absorb
these real economic shocks, they become an independent source of shocks that can
even reduce economic welfare (cf. Neumeyer, 1998). In the words of Buiter (2000):
"I view exchange rate ￿ exibility as a source of shocks and instability as well as
(or even rather than) a mechanism for responding e⁄ectively to fundamental shocks
originating elsewhere". This result is supported by a growing literature analysing
exchange rate volatility within a structural VAR framework. For example, Artis and
Ehrmann (2006) and Farrant and Peersman (2006) ￿nd that a signi￿cant share of
nominal and real exchange rate ￿ uctuations is explained by shocks originating in the
foreign exchange market itself, which they attribute to movements in a currency risk
premium.
Most of the literature has focused on explaining this ￿nding with di⁄erent types of
foreign exchange market imperfections stemming from trading techniques and insti-
tutional factors or from investor￿ s irrationality, leading to various types of behaviour
6that can amplify volatility, cf. the market-microstructure literature (see Evans, 2009
for a recent overview). The excess volatility of exchange rates can, however, also
stem from political interference and weak macroeconomic policy institutions (e.g.
Neumeyer, 1998, and Kuttner and Posen, 2000). It seems obvious that emerging
market economies and very small open economies are particularly vulnerable to these
problems and that the relative costs of ￿ oating exchange rates in these countries are
therefore more relevant when analysing the costs and bene￿ts of IT.
3.2. Measuring excessive exchange rate volatility
Durlauf and Hall (1988, 1989) suggest a general signal-extracting approach for ra-
tional expectations present-value models under the presumption that the underlying
model is false. In this case, the model is assumed to be a sum of two unobserved
components: a combination of the data implied by the speci￿c model under the null,
and an unobserved component that can be labelled model noise. The idea is then
to perform a signal-extraction exercise on the data to estimate a lower bound for
the variance of the noise component. This approach has been used by Durlauf and
Hall (1989) to analyse models of stock prices, by Durlauf and Maccini (1995) to
analyse inventory models, and by Konuki (1999) to analyse models of exchange rate
determination.2 This approach is used here using the standard monetary model of
exchange rate determination as the null model. The three standard building blocks
of the model are given by a money-market equilibrium condition, a purchasing power
parity condition and an interest rate parity condition
mt ￿ pt = ’yt ￿ ￿it (3.1)





t + E(st+1 j￿t) ￿ st + ￿t (3.3)
where mt is domestic money supply, pt and p￿
t are the domestic and foreign price
levels, respectively, yt is real domestic output, it and i￿
t are the short-term domestic
and foreign nominal interest rates respectively, st is the multilateral spot exchange
rate (the domestic currency price of one unit of a basket of foreign currencies) and
E(st+1 j￿t) denotes rational expectations of the one quarter ahead spot rate, condi-
tional on the public information set ￿t available at time t.
The variable ￿t denotes deviations from the rational expectations interest rate
parity condition, and can be interpreted as a time-varying exchange rate risk pre-
mium that investors require to compensate for investing in domestic assets or, al-
ternatively, as capturing deviations from the standard monetary model ￿ i.e. the
non-fundamental or misalignment part of the exchange rate.3
From (3.1)-(3.3), using the law of iterative expectations and imposing a no-bubble
condition, the spot exchange rate can be written as
2See Engel and West (2005) for a slightly di⁄erent approach to analyse models of exchange rate
determination.
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i.e. as the perfect foresight exchange rate under the null, the following relation
between the actual spot rate and s￿
t is obtained, where the actual rate equals the
sum of the expected fundamental rate and exchange rate noise
st = E(s
￿
t j￿t) + ￿t (3.8)
Under the null hypothesis, the assumption of rational expectations implies that
E(s
￿
t j￿t) = s
￿
t ￿ vt (3.9)
where vt is the rational expectations forecast error, which satis￿es E(vt j￿t) = 0.
Inserting this into (3.8) gives
st ￿ s
￿
t = ￿t ￿ vt (3.10)
Hence, a linear projection of (st￿s￿




t j￿t) = proj(￿t j￿t) = b ￿t (3.11)
where proj(xt j￿t) denotes an operator which linearly projects xt onto the informa-
tion set ￿t. A linear projection of (st ￿ s￿
t) on ￿t is therefore the same as a linear
projection of ￿t on ￿t. Finally, by de￿ning
￿t = proj(￿t j￿t) ￿ proj(￿t j￿t) = ￿t ￿ b ￿t (3.12)
the following is obtained
￿t = b ￿t + ￿t (3.13)
8This implies that the variance of ￿t can be written as a sum of the variance of
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2
￿ (A.14)
and, thus, that ￿2
b ￿ gives a lower bound estimate of the true variance of exchange rate
noise, ￿2
￿. Durlauf and Hall (1989) also show that if the information set ￿t includes
current values of st and ft, this signal extraction approach corresponds to an optimal
Kalman ￿lter smoothing estimate of ￿t and that b ￿t is an optimal predictor of ￿t.4
4. The country sample
This section describes the country sample used and the IT dating scheme applied.
The sample period used includes quarterly data for the period 1985-2005. There are
a few exceptions where quarterly data for the whole period was not available or not
used. In most cases this involved the former communist countries in Eastern Europe,
where any meaningful economic analysis would usually use data starting in the early
1990s, and countries which have experience hyperin￿ ation episodes, such as Brazil,
where the analysis starts 1995 after the real plan was adopted.
4.1. The in￿ ation-targeting countries
Since New Zealand pioneered the in￿ ation targeting framework in early 1990, an
increasing number of countries have chosen in￿ ation targeting as their monetary
policy framework. This study includes twenty-one of those countries, including nine-
teen current IT countries by year-end 2001, in addition to Finland and Spain, who
adopted IT in the early 1990s before joining the EMU in 1999 (see Table 1).5
While there is broad agreement in the literature on the general characteristics and
de￿nition of in￿ ation targeting (see PØtursson, 2005), there remains some discrepancy
on the exact timing of IT adoption in some countries. This is largely because these
countries adopted the regime only gradually towards a full-￿ edged IT. This can
make the exact timing of IT adoption somewhat di¢ cult and alternative dates can
be argued for, based on which features of targeting framework are deemed necessary
for it to be de￿ned as a formal IT framework.
This paper follows Fracasso et al. (2003), which again follow the timing con-
vention in Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), except in Korea, New Zealand and
Thailand, where the local central bank has suggested an alternative starting date.
There are, however, three exceptions. Fracasso et al. (2003) de￿ne the starting date
of IT in New Zealand as being April 1988 when a numerical object for in￿ ation
was ￿rst announced in the New Zealand￿ s Government budget statement. Following
4PØtursson (2009) ￿nds that this variance plays a key role in explaining the cross-country vari-
ation in in￿ ation volatility, along with monetary policy shocks and the degree of exchange rate
pass-through. These three control variables also play a key role, along with the adoption of IT, in
explaining the development of in￿ ation volatility over the last two decades.
5Peru and the Philippines adopted IT in 2002 and, more recently, Indonesia, Romania and
Slovakia in 2005, Turkey in 2006 and Ghana in 2007.
9Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), this paper de￿nes the starting date as March
1990 when the ￿rst Policy Targets Agreement between the Minister of Finance and
the Governor of the newly independent Reserve Bank of New Zealand was pub-
lished, specifying numerical targets for in￿ ation and the dates by which they were to
be achieved. The second country is Chile, where this paper follows Truman (2003)
and de￿nes the starting date as September 1990, when the Central Bank of Chile
￿rst announced an in￿ ation target, rather than January 1991 as in Fracasso et al.
(2003) which is the start of the ￿rst calendar year of the new regime. Others, such
as Schaechter et al. (2000) de￿ne the starting date as September 1999 when the
crawling exchange rate peg was abolished and a full-￿ edged IT regime was ￿nally
in place. The third country is Australia, where I follow Schaechter et al. (2000)
and assume the starting date as April 1993 when the Reserve Bank of Australia
announced the adoption of the new framework, rather than September 1994 when
an exact numerical target was ￿rst announced (cf. Bernanke et al., 1999, and Ball
and Sheridan, 2005).6 Finally, the IT group used in this paper includes Switzerland,
even though the Swiss National Bank does not regard itself as such (see Rich, 2000).
Including Switzerland is, however, standard in most IT studies, although Truman
(2003) and Ball and Sheridan (2005) are important exceptions.
It is however important to note, as the robustness analysis reported below sug-
gests, that the main empirical results of this paper are not sensitive to the exact
speci￿cation of the IT adoption dates and the country group.
4.2. The non-targeting countries
The study also includes an additional control group of twenty-three countries, thus
giving a total country sample of forty-four countries. The control group includes
the remaining ten EMU countries and thirteen other industrial and emerging market
countries. The latter thirteen countries were chosen so as to roughly match the
income level and size of the IT countries. Of the nineteen current IT countries
analysed, ￿fteen are OECD members, with Iceland being the smallest (PPP adjusted
GDP in 2006 of 8.1 billion US dollars) and Mexico being the least developed (PPP
adjusted GDP per capita in 2006 of 10.4 thousand US dollars), according to the CIA
World Factbook. Of the remaining OECD countries, only Turkey falls below Mexico
in terms of income (GDP per capita in 2006 of 8.9 thousand US dollars) with Iceland
also the smallest OECD member.
For choosing the additional countries, I therefore exclude all non-IT countries
falling below Turkey in terms of GDP per capita and below Iceland in terms of GDP
levels.7 After excluding countries where quarterly data for a su¢ cient time span
6Other adoption dates, slightly di⁄erent from the ones used here have been suggested. In addition
to those mentioned in the main text, most of these alternative dates have been proposed by Ball
and Sheridan (2005), who argue that the start of the regime should be dated in 1992Q1 in Canada,
1994Q1 in Finland and 1995Q1 in Sweden. Schaechter et al. (2000) have also argued that the
adoption date for Israel should be 1997Q2. Furthermore, Truman (2003) argues that the starting
date for Mexico should be as early as 1995Q1.
7There is, however, one exception with Malta being included although its GDP is only 8.1 billion
US dollars so as to add one observation of a very small, open economy to the control group.
10was not available, countries which cannot reasonably be described as decentralised
market-based economies, and countries which have experienced serious military con-
￿ icts within the sample period, I am left with the group of thirteen countries shown
in the ￿nal column of Table 1.
Table 1. The country sample
In￿ ation targeting Adoption EMU Membership Other
countries date countries date countries
Australia 1993Q2 Austria 1999Q1 Cyprus
Brazil 1999Q2 Belgium 1999Q1 Denmark
Canada 1991Q1 Finland 1999Q1 Estonia
Chile 1990Q3 France 1999Q1 Hong Kong
Columbia 1999Q3 Germany 1999Q1 Japan
Czech Republic 1998Q1 Greece 2001Q1 Latvia
Finland 1993Q1 Ireland 1999Q1 Lithuania
Hungary 2001Q2 Italy 1999Q1 Malta
Iceland 2001Q1 Luxembourg 1999Q1 Slovakia
Israel 1992Q1 Netherlands 1999Q1 Slovenia
Korea 1998Q2 Portugal 1999Q1 Taiwan
Mexico 1999Q1 Spain 1999Q1 Turkey









Finland and Spain moved from in￿ ation targeting to EMU membership in
January 1999.
As the table shows, the control group includes countries ranging from very small
emerging market countries, such as Cyprus and Malta, to very large developed coun-
tries, such as Japan and the United States, in addition to the highly developed EMU
countries. This should give a control group that is su¢ ciently heterogeneous to o⁄er
an interesting comparison to the IT country group which also contains a similarly
heterogeneous group of countries ranging from small to large, and from emerging to
highly developed. The control group also o⁄ers a country set with a wide array of
monetary policy frameworks, ranging from exchange rate pegs, currency boards, and
monetary union, to ￿ oating exchange rates with monetary targets or other hybrid
frameworks.8
8It should be kept in mind that some of these countries do not pursue a truly independent
monetary policy for some part of the sample period (e.g. the EMU countries), or a monetary
policy that is similar to that of the IT countries (e.g. the European countries, Japan and the
United States). This may reduce the number of truly independent observations in the control
group and make the identi￿cation of the treatment e⁄ect more di¢ cult. Including the emerging
market countries is therefore important to help reducing this potential identi￿cation problem.
115. Empirical results
The ￿rst step in obtaining the noise component of exchange rate volatility, b ￿t, is
to estimate the money-market relation (3.1) for the sample period available to get
values of ’ and ￿, used to measure the discount factor and calculate the fundamental
exchange rate. This is done using the dynamic OLS (DOLS) approach of Stock
and Watson (1993) with one lead and lag of the data. For those countries where
’ > 1, a unit income elasticity was imposed. Having obtained estimates of ’ and ￿,
data for the fundamentals from equation (3.5) can be generated using the end-point
















The ￿nal step is to generate b ￿t. This is done by projecting (st ￿ s￿
t) on the
information set ￿t, which is assumed to include a constant and current and four
lags of st and ft, using a Newey-West adjusted covariance matrix. This gives the
estimated exchange rate noise series b ￿t.
5.1. GARCH estimates of the in￿ ation-targeting e⁄ect
Assuming that b ￿t can be approximated by an AR(1) process10
b ￿t = ￿ + ￿b ￿t￿1 + ￿t (5.2)
the variance of the estimated model noise ￿2
b ￿, which is a lower bound on the variance
of actual model noise as mentioned above, is given as ￿2
b ￿ = ￿2
￿=(1 ￿ ￿2).
To capture the possible e⁄ects of IT on the volatility of exchange rate noise, I ￿rst
use a GARCH model to capture the possible time-variation of ￿2
b ￿. More speci￿cally,
I assume that the time variation of ￿2
￿ can be described by a component GARCH
(CGARCH) model which allows for mean reversion in the variance of exchange rate
noise to a time-varying long-run level. The CGARCH model thus consists of two
components, ￿rst a component describing the transitory part, ￿2
￿;t￿!t, and a second
component describing the long-run time-varying volatility, !t
(￿
2
￿;t ￿ !t) = ￿(￿
2
t￿1 ￿ !t￿1) + ￿(￿
2
￿;t￿1 ￿ !t￿1) (5.3)




￿;t￿1) + ￿Dt (5.4)
9In some cases the terminal value of (5.1) tends to jump for the last few observations. To avoid
this problem, data for 2006 and observations for what was available for 2007, plus arti￿cial data
was used to generate three further years of data. The arti￿cial data was constructed by assuming
a 2% annual steady state rate of in￿ ation, a 3% steady state rate of growth, a 5% (the sum of
in￿ ation and output growth) steady state growth rate of money and an unchanged interest rate
and exchange rate from the last observation. The results are not sensitive to these assumptions.
10This is consistent with Backus et al. (1993), who ￿nd that the exchange rate risk premium can
be approximated by a persistent AR(1) process.
12where Dt is a dummy variable that equals unity from the ￿rst quarter after IT
adoption. This setup therefore allows Dt to a⁄ect the permanent component of the
variance of exchange rate noise, with the long run variance of ￿t changing from $ to
$ + ￿=(1 ￿  ) after IT.
Equations (5.3)-(5.4), together with the level equation (5.2), are estimated for
each IT country. The estimation period covers the whole period for which b ￿t is
available, which is from 1986Q2-2005Q4 in most cases.11 The results are shown in
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￿;t￿1 + ￿Dt (5.5)
A positive IT e⁄ect, implying that IT has increased the volatility of exchange
rate noise, is found in about half of the countries but the e⁄ect is only statistically
signi￿cant in three of them. Two of those, Poland and South Africa, are emerging
market countries while the third one is Iceland; a very small industrial country with
a ￿nancial system that shares a number of the characteristics of emerging markets
with less developed ￿nancial systems. At least two of those, Iceland and Poland (at
least in the early years of the IT framework), have also experienced some lack of
political and institutional commitment to the IT framework. Of the countries where
a negative IT e⁄ect is found, four are found to be statistically signi￿cant: Australia,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Columbia and Mexico, all of which (at least the
￿rst three) are quite successful in￿ ation targeters.
It is interesting that in almost all of the countries where ￿ is found to be positive
are emerging market countries who all have their currencies traded in a relatively
thin and less developed foreign exchange markets and are more likely to lack the
institutional support for the IT framework. In fact, the median estimate for the
emerging market countries (including Iceland) is found to be positive, while it is
negative for the more developed countries (excluding Iceland). This suggests that
the development and liquidity of the foreign exchange market may play a key role in
determining whether IT adoption increases excessive exchange rate volatility. Less
developed ￿nancial systems and less liquid foreign exchange markets, a typical prop-
erty of emerging market economies (see Ho and McCauley, 2003), are less likely to be
successful in absorbing shocks and distributing and pricing risk. They are also often
typi￿ed by a lack of important ￿nancial contracts or pricing distortions in available
ones, and are often susceptible to one-way trading ￿ ows, stop-loss trading strategies,
11The exceptions are Brazil (from 1996Q2), Chile (from 1987Q2), Columbia (from 1995Q2),
the Czech Republic (from 1993Q2), Hungary (from 1992Q2), Israel (from 1988Q1), Poland (from
1992Q1), and Thailand (from 1994Q2). Special dummy variables for changes in indirect taxes were
included in the level equation for Australia (2000Q3), Canada (1991Q1 and 1994Q1-Q2), Norway
(2003Q1 and 2003Q2) and the UK (1990Q2). Additional dummy variables are included in the
level equation for Brazil (1999Q1, re￿ ecting the Brazilian debt crisis), Israel (1998Q4, re￿ ecting the
Asian crisis), Mexico (1995Q1, re￿ ecting the Mexican debt crisis), New Zealand (1991Q4, re￿ ecting
a large outlier), Sweden (1993Q1, to ensure a positive long-run variance), and Thailand (1997Q3-Q4
and 1998Q1, re￿ ecting the Asian crisis). The dummy variables are unity in the given quarter and
zero elsewhere, except the Canadian 1994Q1-Q2 dummy (0.75 in 1994Q1 and 0.25 in 1994Q2).
13and herd behaviour. It is, however, worth emphasising that the overall GARCH re-
sults show no clear evidence that IT adoption leads to increased excessive exchange
rate volatility.
Table 2. GARCH estimates of IT e⁄ect on exchange rate noise
EGARCH model CGARCH model
Long-run variance Long-run variance
IT Before After IT Before After
e⁄ect IT IT e⁄ect IT IT
Australia -1.931 0.400 0.153 -0.00013 0.234 0.131
(5.0) (67.7)
Brazil 0.002 0.493 0.494 0.00328 0.057 0.741
(0.0) (1.3)
Canada 0.006 0.080 0.081 0.00016 0.052 0.099
(0.0) (0.5)
Chile -0.710 0.274 0.138 -0.00037 0.400 0.137
(0.7) (1.3)
Columbia -0.155 0.019 0.013 -0.00015 0.103 0.051
(0.7) (2.3)
Czech Republic 0.062 0.038 0.042 0.00016 0.042 0.062
(0.3) (0.6)
Finland 0.243 0.120 0.174 0.00018 0.085 0.189
(0.7) (0.3)
Hungary 0.024 0.173 0.187 -0.00003 0.075 0.056
(0.1) (0.3)
Iceland 2.231 0.058 0.265 0.00285 0.061 0.229
(3.3) (2.4)
Israel -0.129 0.156 0.089 -0.00010 0.147 0.097
(0.6) (0.4)
Korea 0.092 0.231 0.258 0.00015 0.166 0.223
(0.2) (0.6)
Mexico -0.165 0.251 0.182 -0.00037 0.533 0.358
(1.1) (11.1)
New Zealand -0.475 0.238 0.147 -0.00008 0.142 0.123
(1.5) (0.2)
Norway 0.285 0.039 0.087 0.00023 0.037 0.091
(0.9) (1.3)
Poland 0.335 0.038 0.106 0.00036 0.058 0.344
(3.2) (11.7)
South Africa 0.864 0.316 0.942 0.00101 0.154 0.621
(3.6) (4.4)
Spain -0.151 0.028 0.000 -0.00006 0.046 0.025
(1.5) (0.9)
Sweden 0.003 0.054 0.054 0.00019 0.026 0.075
(0.0) (0.6)
Switzerland -0.093 0.053 0.031 -0.00009 0.096 0.047
(1.1) (8.1)
Thailand -0.191 0.025 0.020 -0.00020 0.118 0.037
(0.7) (1.4)
United Kingdom -0.284 0.067 0.023 -0.00024 0.139 0.054
(3.1) (1.5)
Absolute z-values are in parentheses using Bollerslev-Wooldridge heteroscedastic-
ity consistent variance-covariance estimates. Variances are reported in percent-
ages.
145.2. Estimating the in￿ ation-targeting e⁄ect in a multi-country setup
The next step is to analyse the e⁄ect of IT on the volatility of exchange rate noise
using pooled data, thus utilising both the country and time dimensions of the full
sample. In this case, I use three di⁄erent measures of excess exchange rate volatility.
The ￿rst is obtained by calculating the variance of b ￿t using a rolling two year window.
The second applies the same method but uses a four year window. The ￿nal one is
obtained by using the permanent component of a CGARCH model similar to (5.4)
above but without the regime-change dummy variable.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics on volatility of exchange rate noise
Measuring variance of exchange rate noise with a rolling 2 year horizon
Pre-targeting Post-targeting
All period period period
All countries 0.218 0.253 0.197
IT countries 0.302 0.299 0.288
EMU countries 0.120 0.134 0.078
Other countries 0.231 0.255 0.248
Industrial countries 0.174 0.150 0.136
Emerging market countries 0.464 0.325 0.298
Measuring variance of exchange rate noise with a rolling 4 year horizon
Pre-targeting Post-targeting
All period period period
All countries 0.505 0.425 0.438
IT countries 0.634 0.731 0.617
EMU countries 0.284 0.310 0.195
Other countries 0.458 0.313 0.457
Industrial countries 0.356 0.304 0.344
Emerging market countries 0.831 0.731 0.634
Measuring variance of exchange rate noise with a CGARCH model
Pre-targeting Post-targeting
All period period period
All countries 0.081 0.081 0.085
IT countries 0.094 0.090 0.089
EMU countries 0.033 0.030 0.025
Other countries 0.090 0.084 0.094
Industrial countries 0.058 0.057 0.057
Emerging market countries 0.118 0.100 0.103
Numbers reported are median variances in percentages. For non-IT and non-EMU
countries, the pre-targeting period corresponds to data prior to 1998 and the post-
targeting period to the period from 1998.
Table 3 reports median variances for the three measures for the whole country
sample and the three di⁄erent sub-groups, while Figures 1-3 in Appendix A show the
individual country data, with solid red vertical lines indicating IT adoption dates and
broken green vertical lines EMU membership dates. For the non-IT and non-EMU
countries, I use the weighted average IT and EMU adoption date as the break-date,
similar to what is commonly done in the empirical IT literature (cf. Mishkin and
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007). This gives a break-date at 1998Q1, i.e. the pre-targeting
period is 1985-1997 while the post-targeting period is 1998-2005.
15Although the actual level of excessive exchange rate volatility di⁄ers slightly
across the three di⁄erent variance measures, excessive volatility seems to have declined
in the post-targeting period, especially in the EMU countries. The table also reports
median variances for industrial and emerging market countries, clearly showing that
the volatility of exchange rate noise is higher in emerging market countries than in
the industrial ones.
Table 4. Panel estimates of IT e⁄ect on exchange rate noise
Measuring variance of exchange rate noise with a rolling 2 year horizon
Group 1 Group 2
Fixed Random Fixed Random
IT coe¢ cient estimate -0.00014 -0.00008 -0.00014 -0.00008
t-value 1.03 0.63 1.04 0.58
Number of observations 2,826 2,826 2,328 2,328
Standard error of regression 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
First order serial correlation 0.21 0.13 0.31 0.21
Measuring variance of exchange rate noise with a rolling 4 year horizon
Group 1 Group 2
Fixed Random Fixed Random
IT coe¢ cient estimate -0.00007 -0.00003 -0.00007 -0.00003
t-value 0.65 0.35 0.65 0.28
Number of observations 2,607 2,607 2,127 2,127
Standard error of regression 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
First order serial correlation 0.73 0.50 0.82 0.65
Measuring variance of exchange rate noise with a CGARCH model
Group 1 Group 2
Fixed Random Fixed Random
IT coe¢ cient estimate 0.00005 0.00010 -0.00001 0.00004
t-value 0.52 1.10 0.13 0.39
Number of observations 2,909 2,909 2,404 2,404
Standard error of regression 0.0015 0.0015 0.0013 0.0013
First order serial correlation 0.88 0.79 0.57 0.50
T-values are absolute values obtained using robust cross-section panel corrected stan-
dard errors. The random e⁄ect speci￿cation is estimated using feasible GLS. The test
for ￿rst-order serial correlation reports p-values. The ￿rst country group includes
all the 44 countries used in the paper: the 21 IT countries and a control group of
23 additional countries. The second country group includes 34 countries: the 21 IT
countries and a control group of 13 industrial countries.
To formally estimate the possible e⁄ect of IT adoption in a panel setup, the
following model is estimated
Vj;t = ￿ + ￿(L)Vj;t￿1 + ￿Dj;t + ￿j + "j;t (5.6)
where Vj;t is the volatility of exchange rate noise in country j in period t, ￿ is
the overall constant in the model, ￿j is a country-speci￿c e⁄ect (either assumed to
be ￿xed or random), "j;t is an error term and Dt is the in￿ ation target dummy that
16equals unity from the ￿rst quarter after IT adoption if country j is a targeter but zero
throughout for non-targeters.12 ￿(L) is a lag polynomial in the dependent variable
controlling for the persistence in the volatility of exchange rate noise discussed above
(which can either be intrinsic or re￿ ect other omitted determinants of volatility). Two
lags were needed for Vj;t using the rolling-window variances but one was su¢ cient
for Vj;t from the CGARCH model to ensure that the residual autocorrelation is
insigni￿cant. The random e⁄ect speci￿cation is estimated using feasible GLS and
t-values are obtained using robust cross-section panel corrected standard errors.
Table 4 reports the results using a panel with two alternative control groups: ￿rst,
all the additional twenty-three countries used in the study; and second, a sample of
thirteen industrial countries.13 Both control groups give rise to a large panel sample
of between 2,127-2,909 observations. As can be seen from the table, the IT e⁄ect is
found to be negative in all cases except in some instances when the CGARCH model
is used to measure Vj;t. The e⁄ects are, however, very imprecisely estimated and the
t-values therefore very small. The results therefore seem to corroborate the ￿ndings
from the GARCH models for individual countries, i.e. that there is no evidence that
IT adoption increases excessive volatility in exchange rates. As the table shows, the
results are found to be robust to using either ￿xed or random country e⁄ects and
Hausman tests provide little evidence against the null hypothesis that there is no
misspeci￿cation.
5.3. Comparing the e⁄ects of in￿ ation targeting and EMU membership
The country sample also includes twelve European countries that experienced another
major change in their monetary policy regime, when they joined a monetary union in
1999 (or 2001 in the case of Greece). If exchange rates move too much, an entry into a
monetary union should see a clear decline in excessive exchange rate volatility. EMU
membership can therefore serve as a check on the ability of the framework proposed
to detect the relation between monetary policy regimes and excessive exchange rate
volatility. The e⁄ects of EMU membership are also of interest in itself as the existence
of a signi￿cant EMU e⁄ect on excessive exchange rate volatility lends support to the
argument that ￿ oating exchange rates are too volatile.
Table 5 reports the results from the two GARCH models for the EMU countries.
The estimation period is again 1986Q2-2005Q4.14 The EMU e⁄ect is found to be
negative in eleven of the twelve EMU countries (or ten in the EGARCH model)
and is found to be signi￿cantly negative in nine of the countries (in either GARCH
speci￿cations). In none of the cases where a positive sign on ￿ is found, are the EMU
e⁄ects found to be statistically signi￿cant from zero.15
12In the case of Finland and Spain, the IT dummy becomes zero again from 1999Q1.
13The industrial countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United States.
14The exceptions are Austria (from 1989Q2), Ireland (from 1987Q1), and Portugal (from 1996Q2).
The GARCH models include a dummy variable in the level equation for France (1992Q4, re￿ ect-
ing the ERM crisis), Ireland (1990Q4, re￿ ecting a large outlier), and Italy (1992Q4 and 1993Q1,
re￿ ecting the ERM crisis). The dummy variables are unity in the given quarter and zero elsewhere.
15Allowing also for the previous IT adoption in Finland and Spain only strengthens the negative
17The GARCH models therefore suggest that EMU membership has reduced the
volatility of exchange rate noise. The median point estimate for the unconditional
standard deviation of exchange rate noise falls from 2.3% to 1.4% in the CGARCH
model (from 1.9% to 1.4% in the EGARCH model), or by roughly a quarter.
Table 5. GARCH estimates of EMU e⁄ects on exchange rate noise
EGARCH model CGARCH model
Long-run variance Long-run variance
EMU Before After EMU Before After
e⁄ect EMU EMU e⁄ect EMU EMU
Austria -0.398 0.017 0.012 -0.00001 0.021 0.015
(1.0) (2.6)
Belgium 0.030 0.021 0.022 -0.00001 0.027 0.023
(0.1) (5.6)
Finland -0.896 0.146 0.044 -0.00032 0.219 0.011
(2.8) (2.1)
France 0.003 0.028 0.028 0.00008 0.021 0.036
(0.0) (0.6)
Germany -0.178 0.042 0.029 -0.00015 0.055 0.026
(4.8) (1.2)
Greece -0.300 0.064 0.035 -0.00003 0.050 0.022
(0.8) (0.8)
Ireland -0.063 0.031 0.014 -0.00005 0.075 0.004
(1.6) (2.1)
Italy -0.267 0.130 0.099 -0.00013 0.107 0.026
(0.3) (1.6)
Luxembourg -0.921 0.075 0.019 -0.00031 0.110 0.023
(1.0) (3.3)
Netherlands -0.183 0.013 0.008 -0.00001 0.022 0.016
(4.5) (1.1)
Portugal -0.216 0.012 0.008 -0.00001 0.017 0.010
(1.1) (11.9)
Spain -1.721 0.058 0.020 -0.00009 0.066 0.003
(3.1) (24.9)
Absolute z-values are in parentheses using Bollerslev-Wooldridge heteroscedastic-
ity consistent variance-covariance estimates. Variances are reported in percent-
ages.
This fall in excess exchange rate volatility implied by the GARCH estimates is
con￿rmed by the panel results. Table 6 redoes the panel analysis while adding an
EMU dummy variable to the panel speci￿cation in (5.6) and testing jointly for the
e⁄ects of IT and EMU membership. Note that the distinction between treatment and
control groups becomes slightly more complicated in this case. The analysis includes
nineteen current IT countries plus the twelve EMU countries, but accounting for the
temporary IT adoption of Finland and Spain. Because the IT and EMU e⁄ects are
analysed jointly, the IT countries act as a control for the EMU e⁄ect and vice versa
for the IT e⁄ect. There are in addition thirteen countries in the ￿rst country sample
that act as a pure control and three additional countries in the latter industrial
country group.
EMU e⁄ect, while also giving a signi￿cantly negative IT e⁄ect in both countries.
18Table 6. Panel estimates of IT and EMU e⁄ects on exchange rate noise
Measuring variance of exchange rate noise with a rolling 2 year horizon
Group 1 Group 2
Fixed Random Fixed Random
IT coe¢ cient estimate -0.00015 -0.00009 -0.00015 -0.00009
t-value 1.08 0.71 1.08 0.66
EMU coe¢ cient estimate -0.00014 -0.00019 -0.00014 -0.00019
t-value 2.53 2.95 2.52 2.86
Number of observations 2,826 2,826 2,328 2,328
Standard error of regression 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
First order serial correlation 0.20 0.20 0.31 0.22
Measuring variance of exchange rate noise with a rolling 4 year horizon
Group 1 Group 2
Fixed Random Fixed Random
IT coe¢ cient estimate -0.00007 -0.00004 -0.00007 -0.00003
t-value 0.69 0.43 0.69 0.36
EMU coe¢ cient estimate -0.00007 -0.00010 -0.00008 -0.00010
t-value 1.64 2.03 1.66 1.93
Number of observations 2,607 2,607 2,127 2,127
Standard error of regression 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
First order serial correlation 0.73 0.50 0.82 0.65
Measuring variance of exchange rate noise with a CGARCH model
Group 1 Group 2
Fixed Random Fixed Random
IT coe¢ cient estimate 0.00005 0.00009 -0.00002 0.00003
t-value 0.51 0.99 0.16 0.31
EMU coe¢ cient estimate -0.00003 -0.00011 -0.00005 -0.00010
t-value 1.92 2.88 3.06 2.99
Number of observations 2,909 2,909 2,404 2,404
Standard error of regression 0.0015 0.0015 0.0013 0.0013
First order serial correlation 0.88 0.80 0.57 0.50
T-values are absolute values obtained using robust cross-section panel corrected stan-
dard errors. The random e⁄ect speci￿cation is estimated using feasible GLS. The test
for ￿rst-order serial correlation reports p-values. The ￿rst country group includes all
the 44 countries used in the paper: the 21 IT countries, the 12 EMU countries (with
Finland and Spain switching between the IT and EMU groups) and a pure control
group of 13 additional countries. The second country group only uses a pure control
group of 3 industrial countries.
As the results in Table 6 show, the IT e⁄ect continues to be insigni￿cant from
zero, while the EMU e⁄ect is signi￿cantly negative at the 5% critical level in almost
all cases and at the 10% critical level in all instances. The point estimates of the
EMU e⁄ects, taking into account the lagged dynamics of Vj;t, suggest a long-run
EMU e⁄ect ranging from 0.01% in the ￿xed e⁄ect speci￿cation using the CGARCH
estimate of Vj;t to 0.25% in the random e⁄ect speci￿cation using the four year rolling
window estimate of Vj;t. Using the pre-targeting median values of Vj;t from Table 3
therefore implies an average decline in the standard deviation of exchange rate noise
19(across the three volatility measures and di⁄erent panel model speci￿cations) from
4.0% in the period prior to EMU membership to 2.3% after EMU membership, or
by 1.7 percentage points on average which amounts to a reduction of roughly 40%,
a somewhat larger e⁄ect than obtained in the GARCH analysis. EMU membership
therefore seems to lead to a sizeable reduction in excessive exchange rate volatility,
while IT apparently has no e⁄ect.16 The results are found to be robust to using either
￿xed or random country e⁄ects and Hausman tests provide little evidence against
the null hypothesis that there is no misspeci￿cation.
5.4. Robustness checks
This section addresses whether the results are robust to a number of alternative
speci￿cations of the estimated models, dating of policy regime changes and control
groups. Overall, the results seem very robust (further detail on the results of these
robustness tests is available from author).
5.4.1. Alternative in￿ ation targeting dates and control groups
Timing of in￿ ation target adoption As previously discussed, the literature has
proposed several alternative dates for some targeting countries. An important ques-
tion is therefore how robust the results are to changes in the timing of IT adoption.
To analyse this, I look at countries where the adoption dates suggested are four
quarters or more away from the dates used in this paper (either earlier or later). The
alternative dates chosen are from Ball and Sheridan (2005): 1994Q4 for Australia,
1992Q1 for Canada, 1994Q1 for Finland and 1995Q1 for Sweden; Schaechter et al.
(2000): 1999Q3 for Chile and 1997Q2 for Israel; Truman (2003): 1995Q1 for Mexico;
and Fracasso et al. (2003): 1988Q2 for New Zealand. Finally, since some studies
argue that Switzerland should not be treated as an IT country (cf. Truman, 2003),
Switzerland is excluded from the IT group.
Adopting these alternative IT dates and excluding Switzerland from the treat-
ment group does not alter the panel regression results in any way. However, individ-
ual GARCH results for some countries change: the IT e⁄ect is no longer found to be
signi￿cant in Mexico but in the EGARCH model it becomes signi￿cantly positive in
Israel and signi￿cantly negative in New Zealand.
Speci￿cation of control group In the baseline panel regressions, the volatility
of exchange rate noise in IT and EMU countries is compared to two di⁄erent control
groups including non-IT countries and non-EMU members. An alternative approach
is to compare the treatment countries to their own pre-treatment experience, i.e. to
exclude all non-IT countries from the panel in the IT case and all non-EMU countries
in the EMU case. The results remain unchanged when looking at a panel of all IT
countries: the IT e⁄ect remains insigni￿cant from zero. However, when looking
at some subsamples of veteran targeters, such as the thirteen countries who had
16Focusing only on the EMU e⁄ect and including the IT countries in the treatment group gives
identical results.
20adopted IT prior to 2000 or the seven countries who had adopted IT prior to 1999
and have a history of low in￿ ation prior to IT, the IT e⁄ect becomes signi￿cantly
negative for some speci￿cations of Vj;t. As for the EMU countries, the EMU e⁄ect
remains signi￿cantly negative for both rolling-window measures of Vj;t (although the
point estimates tend to be slightly lower) but becomes insigni￿cant from zero for the
CGARCH measure of Vj;t.
5.4.2. Alternative model speci￿cations and estimation methods
Di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence cross-section speci￿cation A common approach in
analysing the economic e⁄ects of regime changes, such as IT, is to use the so-called
di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimator (see, for example, Ball and Sheridan, 2005 and
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007). In this case the following cross-section speci￿-
cation of equation (5.6) is estimated
Vj;post ￿ Vj;pre = ￿0 + ￿1Dj + ￿2Vj;pre + uj (5.7)
where Vj;post is the variance of exchange rate noise after IT, Vj;pre is the variance of
exchange rate noise prior to IT, ￿0, ￿1 and ￿2 are reduced form coe¢ cients, and
uj is an error term. Equation (5.7) therefore measures the IT e⁄ect taking initial
conditions into account, i.e. the pre-targeting level of exchange rate noise variability,
using 1998Q1 as the break-date for non-targeting countries, as previously explained.
Equation (5.7) is thus estimated for the whole country sample, using the nineteen
current IT countries as the treatment group and the other twenty-three countries
as the control group, using four measures of exchange rate noise volatility: sample
averages of the three time-varying volatility measures previously described and the
simple sample variance of b ￿t. The results are found to be the same as in the baseline
case: in all four cases does the IT e⁄ect remain statistically insigni￿cant from zero.
Repeating the analysis using the twelve EMU members as the treatment group
and the remaining thirty-two countries as the control group continues to give a
signi￿cantly negative EMU e⁄ect at the 1% critical level in all cases. Furthermore,
allowing for a simultaneous analysis of both treatments (IT and EMU) with a pure
control group of thirteen countries also gives a signi￿cantly negative EMU e⁄ect at
the 5% critical level in all but one cases and at the 10% critical level in all cases
(again ￿nding an insigni￿cant IT e⁄ect in all cases).
Periodic ￿xed e⁄ects The panel regressions in Tables 4 and 6 only include
country-speci￿c dummies to account for a di⁄erent level of volatility of exchange
rate noise in each country. Time-speci￿c dummies can also be added, capturing
potential common time variation across countries not captured by the dynamics of
equation (5.6). Allowing for cross-country and periodic ￿xed e⁄ects, however, gives
very similar results to those reported in Tables 4 and 6. The only change is that
the EMU e⁄ect becomes insigni￿cant from zero when Vj;t is de￿ned as the perma-
nent component from the CGARCH model. However, Hausman tests provide little
evidence against the null hypothesis that the periodic ￿xed e⁄ects are redundant.
21Speci￿cation of the variance of exchange rate noise A common practice
in cross-country comparison of economic variables is to use the log transformation
log(1+Vj;t) instead of Vj;t directly. This is done to downweight very large observations
which may occur in this analysis during periods of very high in￿ ation and extreme
exchange rate volatility. The drawback of such a transformation, however, is that
it overweights observations that are close to zero. Using this transformation in the
panel regressions gives very similar results to those shown in Tables 4 and 6.
Lagged regime dummies A potential endogeneity bias may arise as the regime
dummies are entered contemporaneously in the GARCH and panel regressions. One
way to reduce this problem is to use one-quarter lags of the IT and EMU dummies.
The results of the panel regressions remain identical, but this leads to slight changes
in the GARCH results. The IT e⁄ect becomes signi￿cantly negative in two addi-
tional countries, Chile and Thailand, but is no longer found signi￿cantly negative
in Columbia. Furthermore, the positive IT e⁄ect in Iceland becomes insigni￿cant.
As for the EMU e⁄ect, it is now found to be insigni￿cant from zero in Ireland but
becomes signi￿cantly negative in the Netherlands. There are also instances where
the regime dummies become non-signi￿cant from zero in one of the GARCH models
but remain signi￿cant in the other (Australia and Spain), or switch between models
compared to the baseline results (Mexico).
Instrumental variables If IT adoption or EMU membership is endogenous with
respect to volatility of exchange rate noise, simply using lagged regime dummies
may not be su¢ cient to address the potential endogeneity problem in the panel
regressions. Therefore, an instrumental variable approach is needed. Due to the lack
of obvious instruments for the regime dummies, a common choice in the literature is
to use lagged values of the regime dummies and past in￿ ation performance (see, e.g.
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007, for the case of the IT dummy, and Breedon and
PØtursson, 2006, for the case of the EMU dummy). I therefore use as instruments
a one-quarter lag of the IT dummy (or the IT and EMU dummies in the panel
regression in Table 6), lags of Vj;t and the average pre-targeting in￿ ation in the IT
countries (and average pre-EMU in￿ ation in Table 6), and average pre-1998 in￿ ation
for non-IT and non-EMU countries, as previously explained. I also tried using a
four-quarter moving average of in￿ ation lagged by two years (the exact choice of lag
length does not matter) instead of the historical average above. The results remained
very similar to the ones reported in Tables 4 and 6 in all cases.
6. Conclusions
The experience of the post Bretton-Woods period clearly shows that ￿ oating ex-
change rates can be very volatile. In fact, a growing literature suggests that exchange
rates tend to ￿ uctuate by far more than can reasonably be explained by movements
in economic fundamentals. This raises the question of how useful exchange rates
really are as a mechanism of adjustment in the face of economic shocks. If exchange
22rates ￿ uctuate ￿ too much￿they become an independent source of shocks as well as
(or instead of) being a shock absorber. Another challenging question in this context
is what role the monetary policy regime plays in generating this ￿ excessive￿exchange
rate volatility. This is the topic of this paper. More speci￿cally, the question asked is
whether the adoption of in￿ ation targeting (IT) can lead to more frequent exchange
rate misalignments, i.e. whether this excessive component of exchange rate volatility
increases with IT.
The paper therefore makes a clear distinction between the e⁄ects of IT on the
unconditional variability of exchange rates and the excessive volatility of exchange
rates. The former typically increases after IT, but that observation is neither very
interesting nor insightful. Since IT has usually been adopted after exiting a rigid
exchange rate regime, it is to be expected that exchange rate variability increases
when IT is adopted. Furthermore, it is not clear whether that is to be viewed as
a drawback, as some exchange rate variability is economically e¢ cient as a tool to
adjust relative prices in the face of shocks. Whether IT a⁄ects the excessive (or
noise) component of exchange rate volatility is, however, a much more fundamental
question. If IT contributes to reducing this excessive exchange rate volatility it
improves the shock-absorber ability of the currency and another important positive
aspect of IT emerges. However, if IT contributes to increasing excessive exchange
rate volatility it reduces its shock-absorber ability and the bene￿ts of other aspects of
IT have to be weighed against this drawback, which one might expect to signi￿cantly
reduce the bene￿ts of IT adoption in emerging market economies and other small
open economies with small currencies.
To tackle this issue, the paper adopts a signal-extraction approach to estimate
the excessive exchange rate volatility from multilateral exchange rates of forty-four
countries ranging from lower-medium income countries to highly developed countries.
Di⁄erent GARCH speci￿cations are then estimated for each country and a panel
model for the whole country group, using the IT countries as a treatment group
and the remaining non-targeting countries as a control group. The results seem
clear: there is no evidence that IT leads to greater excessive exchange rate volatility.
Although the GARCH results suggest that this volatility has increased after IT in few
of the countries, they also suggest that excessive volatility has declined after IT in
some of the others countries. A closer inspection of the countries in question suggests
that these results may have more to do with characteristics of the foreign exchange
markets and institutional support for the IT regime rather than IT adoption by itself.
The country sample used in this study also includes another important mone-
tary policy regime switch, i.e. the establishment of the European Monetary Union
(EMU) in 1999. Given that ￿ oating exchange rates are excessively volatile, this
regime change should o⁄er an obvious chance to check the ability of the framework
proposed to detect the relation between monetary policy regimes and this excessive
volatility. Analysing the e⁄ects of EMU membership is also of independent interest
as the existence of a signi￿cant EMU e⁄ect on excessive exchange rate volatility lends
support to the argument that ￿ oating exchange rates are too volatile. Repeating the
analysis using the same GARCH speci￿cations as before, and the panel speci￿cation
for testing the EMU e⁄ect separately and jointly with the IT e⁄ect, gives a signi￿cant
23negative relation between EMU membership and excessive exchange rate volatility.
Thus, EMU membership leads to a signi￿cant reduction in excessive exchange rate
volatility, while IT continues to have no e⁄ects. These results are found to be robust
to a wide array of robustness tests.
So to sum up: Yes, ￿ oating exchange rates seem to be excessively volatile relative
to economic fundamentals and membership in a monetary union will reduce this
excessive volatility. But the adoption of in￿ ation targeting does not contribute to
this excessive volatility by itself. It seems clear however that some countries are
more equipped to embrace a ￿ oating exchange rate regime. The key factors there
are a su¢ ciently deep and e¢ cient foreign exchange market and a strong institutional
support for the nominal anchor chosen rather than whether this anchor is an in￿ ation
target or not.
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Figure 3. Volatility of exchange rate noise (CGARCH model)
30Appendix B: Data sources and description
Consumer price data Quarterly data on the headline consumer price index for
the period 1985-2005, except for the Czech Republic (from 1989Q1), Estonia (the
implicit private consumption price de￿ ator from 1993Q1), Latvia (from 1993Q1),
Lithuania (the implicit private consumption price de￿ ator from 1995Q1), Malta (from
1990Q1), Slovakia (from 1993Q1) and Slovenia (the implicit private consumption
price de￿ ator from 1995Q1).
All the data are seasonally adjusted from source or by the author using X-12.
The data source is Reuters-EcoWin, except for Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia (data
from Eurostat); and Iceland, Israel, Malta and Slovakia (data from national central
bank or statistical o¢ ce).
Exchange rate data Quarterly data on the e⁄ective exchange rate index for
the period 1985-2005, except for Columbia (from 1994), Cyprus (from 1994Q1),
the Czech Republic (from 1991Q1), Estonia (from 1994Q1), Israel (from 1986Q4),
Latvia (from 1994Q1), Lithuania (from 1994Q1), Malta (from 1990Q1), Slovakia
(from 1994Q1) and Slovenia (from 1994Q1). De￿ned as the value of the domestic
currency per one unit of foreign currencies.
The data source is Eurostat, except for Brazil, Chile, Korea, Luxembourg, Mex-
ico, Poland, South Africa, Taiwan and Thailand (data from Reuters-EcoWin and
IFS); the Czech Republic and Hungary (data from Eurostat and IFS); and Hong
Kong, Iceland, Israel and Malta (data from national monetary authority and central
bank).
Interest rate data Quarterly data on the short-term interest rate for the pe-
riod 1985-2005, except for Columbia (from 1986), Cyprus (from 1993Q1), the Czech
Republic (from 1993Q1), Estonia (from 1996Q1), Hungary (from 1987Q1), Ice-
land (from 1988Q4), Israel (from 1986Q1), Latvia (from 1993Q4), Lithuania (from
1994Q3), Malta (from 1993Q1), Slovakia (from 1994Q1), Slovenia (from 1998Q2)
and Turkey (from 1993Q1).
The interest rate is a short-term money market rate, except for Chile (commercial
bank deposit rate for 1985-1995 and money market rate from 1996), Cyprus (t-bill
rate for 1993-1998 and money market rate from 1999), Iceland (Central Bank of
Iceland policy rate), Israel (discount rate for 1985-1987 and Bank of Israel policy
rate from 1988), Lithuania (t-bill rate for 1994-1998 and money market rate from
1999), Malta (t-bill rate for 1993-1994 and money market rate from 1995), Poland
(short-term interest rate from 1991Q3), Taiwan (31-90 days CP rates) and Thailand
(money market rate (weighted average of all maturities) for 1985-1996, 3 month repo
rate for 1997-2002 (up to May), 3 month SWAP rate for 2002 (from June)-2004, 3
month BIBOR rate for 2005).
The data source is Reuters/EcoWin, except for Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey (data from Eurostat); Hong Kong, Iceland,
Taiwan and Thailand (data from national monetary authority or central bank); Chile
31and Israel (data from national central bank and IFS); and Germany, Hungary and
Korea (data from Reuters-EcoWin and IFS).
Money supply data Quarterly data on broad money (M2 or M3 depending on
availability) for the period 1985-2005, except for Chile (from 1986Q1), Cyprus (from
1990Q1), the Czech Republic (from 1992Q1), Estonia (from 1993Q1), Hungary (from
1990Q4), Latvia (from 1993Q1), Lithuania (from 1993Q2), Malta (from 1992Q1),
Poland (from 1989Q4), Slovakia (from 1993Q1) and Slovenia (from 1993Q1).
All the data are seasonally adjusted from source or by the author using X-12.
The data source is Reuters-EcoWin, except for Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia (data from Eurostat); Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain (data from Reuters-EcoWin up to 1998 linked with Euroarea
money supply from 1999 from Eurostat); New Zealand (data on M1 from national
central bank linked with M3 from 1985 to 1987Q1); and Iceland, Israel and Sweden
(data from national central bank).
GDP data Quarterly data on GDP for the period 1985-2005, except for Austria
(from 1988Q1), Brazil (from 1991Q1), Chile (from 1986Q1), Cyprus (from 1995Q1),
the Czech Republic (from 1990Q1), Estonia (from 1993Q1), Latvia (from 1995Q1),
Lithuania (from 1995Q1), Malta (from 1990Q1), Poland (from 1990Q1), Portugal
(from 1995Q1), Slovakia (from 1993Q1), Slovenia (from 1995Q1), Thailand (from
1993Q1) and Turkey (from 1987Q1).
All the data are constant price and seasonally adjusted from source or by the au-
thor using X-12. The data source is Reuters-EcoWin, except for Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovakia,
Slovenia and Spain (data from Eurostat); Columbia (data from Reuters-EcoWin and
IFS); the Czech Republic and Hungary (Reuters-EcoWin and Eurostat); Chile, Ice-
land, Israel, Malta (data from national monetary authority or central bank); and
Ireland and Sweden (data from Reuters-EcoWin and national central bank or statis-
tical o¢ ce).
International data Consumer prices: Quarterly data on OECD countries exclud-
ing high in￿ ation countries (Hungary, Mexico, Poland and Turkey) from Reuters-
EcoWin. Seasonally adjusted using X-12. GDP: Quarterly data on OECD (original
25 members) for the period 1985-2005 from Reuters-EcoWin. Seasonally adjusted
from source. Interest rate: Quarterly data on weighted average of OECD countries
(from OECD Main Economic Indicators), excluding high in￿ ation countries (Hun-
gary, Mexico, Poland and Turkey) using truncated current OECD country weights.
32